



**OPEN SOCIETY
FOUNDATIONS**



Программа: Open Society Institute/ FCO Chevening /University of Leeds
2009-2010

Университет: Университет г. Лидс/ The University of Leeds

Направление: Development Studies

Годы обучения: 2009-10

Автор работы: Джансакова Зарина Муратбековна

Степень: Магистр

E-mail: dzhansakova@gmail.com

Тема исследования: Перспективы консолидации демократии в Кыргызстане.

Краткое резюме (не более 200 слов):

Данная работа – это попытка исследовать перспективы демократии в Кыргызской Республике в рамках теории Асемоглу и Робинсона. Автор рассматривает внутренние факторы, консолидирующие демократический режим в стране. В работе говорится, что политическая элита Кыргызстана находится в процессе перераспределения власти в пользу большего числа граждан, путем внесения соответствующих изменений в Конституцию, и из-за такого фактора, как существенная социальная напряженность. Процесс демократизации обуславливается относительно сформировавшимися демократическими политическими институтами, существующим политическим и экономическим кризисом, и присутствием активного гражданского общества. Данные аргументы берут свое начало из основ теории Асемоглу и Робинсона, которые полагают, что вышеуказанные определяющие факторы, вкупе с экономическим развитием необходимы для консолидации демократического режима, так как в этом случае у элиты не будет материальных стимулов для его свержения. Основываясь на этой теории, автор приходит к заключению, что КР находится в процессе консолидации демократии, однако страна по-прежнему остается склонной к политической нестабильности до тех пор пока экономические условия в стране не улучшатся.

Development Studies
Master's Degree Dissertation

The prospects of democracy consolidation in Kyrgyzstan

Zarina Dzhansakova

ID # 200505065

Word count: 12000

Table of contents

Introduction.....	4
I. The theory of democracy.....	7
II. Kyrgyzstan's pass of political development.....	14
- Country overview.....	14
- The historic background: before and during the Soviet Union.....	16
- The emerge of the independent state and democracy.....	19
III. Building civil society in Kyrgyzstan.....	28
- The role of Kyrgyz culture in emerge and consolidation of the democracy ...	29
- The emerge of civil society.....	31
- The role of civil society in the democracy consolidation.....	33
IV. The economy of independent Kyrgyzstan.....	36
- Economic institutions.....	36
- Economic structure.....	39
- Economic inequality.....	40
Conclusion.....	42
References.....	45

This dissertation looks at internal factors consolidating democracy in Kyrgyzstan. This small newly emerged post Soviet country with nomadic heritage, surrounded by authoritarian regimes of different calibre, is acknowledged to be the most democratic in Central Asia. The recent constitutional referendum conducted by a first female President in the region has strengthened the authority of the Parliament. The political elite in Kyrgyzstan have been redistributing the power to a greater part of the citizens through changes in the Constitution for significant social unrest. This process of democratization is accounted for the relatively established democratic political institutions, current political and economic crisis, and presence of active civil society. These arguments stem from a theoretical framework by Acemoglu and Robinson who believe that the above present determinants of democracy along with economic development are essential for consolidating democratic regime since then the elite would not have economic incentives to overthrow it. Relying on the theory this dissertation concludes that Kyrgyzstan is in the process of consolidating its democracy, however the country is likely to remain prone to political instability until its economic conditions would be improved.

Introduction

From the nature of man, we may be sure that those who have power in their hands...will always, when they can...increase it

Thomas Mason in Birch 2007, p.113

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan took a position of a front-runner in building up the democratic state among all its country neighbours in Central Asia. Political openness and rapid liberalisation of the economy ensured the country's image of an "Island of democracy" in the eye of world community (Anderson 1999, p.23; Osorova 2000; International Crisis Group 2001). Subsequently, the political 'colour' revolution in March 2005, the revolution in April 2010 and the referendum held in June 2010 which approved the new Constitution restricting the authority of the President and transforming the republic into the Parliamentary system strengthened the status of this small post-soviet country surrounded by the autocracies as the most democratic in Central Asia region.

The inter-ethnic conflict broke out in the South of Kyrgyzstan on 11 – 14 June 2010 and then the referendum on adoption new Constitution draw the attention of wide public and generated a number of political experts' opinions. The views of western and eastern politicians and scholars are quite ranged; predominantly the experts from the United States or European Union actively support the democratic changes happening in the country while their colleagues from Russia and Central Asian neighbouring countries express their strong doubts about the suitability and viability of the parliamentarian form of government for a country in this region. For example, after the Kyrgyz referendum on 27th of June Russian President Medvedev stated: "I have a hard time imagining that a parliamentary republic could work in Kyrgyzstan" (Balmasov 2010), while French Human Rights Ambassador Francois Zimeray "positively valued the transition of Kyrgyzstan to a parliamentary system" (AkiPress 2010).

This dissertation attempts to evaluate the extent to which democracy in Kyrgyzstan has consolidated. The purpose of the dissertation is to explore possible factors which shape the political development of the state as a result of which Kyrgyzstan is at present an electoral democracy undergoing a process of consolidation, and is not likely to have sustained authoritarianism.

The theoretical basis of the dissertation is a framework developed by Acemoglu and Robinson “for analyzing the creation and consolidation of democracy” (2006, p.ii). Acemoglu and Robinson argue that confrontation between the citizens and the elite underpin the process of democratization, they believe that democracy can emerge in the presence of two conditions, first is social unrest, which may result in a coup or revolution and second is that the ruling elite considers the costs of democracy are limited unlike the costs of repression (Robinson p. 2006, p.xiv). In the abovementioned circumstances the elite is ready to make credible concessions and transfer more political power to the citizens. This process of redistribution of power and resources is informed by six determinants (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, p.ii):

“(1) the strength of civil society, (2) the structure of political institutions, (3) the nature of political and economic crisis, (4) the level of economic inequality, (5) the structure of economy, and (6) the form and extent of globalization”.

These determinants let the authors of the framework predict in which circumstances the cost of repressions is too high for the elite thus establishing the reasons why some nascent democracies collapse and some manage to sustain democracy.

This dissertation argues that Kyrgyzstan is undergoing a process of democracy consolidation and this process is manipulated between the political elite and the citizens. The former Soviet *nomenklatura* (party elite) formed the government in independent Kyrgyzstan. The change of political leadership in 2005 and 2010 and subsequent changes introduced into the Constitution both times were a result of significant social unrest. This paper argues that this process of democratisation, namely the incorporation of a bigger amount of people in decision-making

through limiting the power of the president and broadening the authority of the Zhogorku Kenesh (Parliament) is shaped with the following factors: created democratic political institutions, political and economic crises followed by the second Kyrgyz democratic revolution and the intense inter-ethnic conflict which took place in the mid of last June, and the presence of relatively strong civil society. These arguments have been established using the Acemoglu and Robinson's theoretical framework, which however states that low level of economic inequality and capital intensive structure of economy along with the above mentioned determinants are essential for sustaining democracy. Therefore, this dissertation also argues that Kyrgyzstan which is at the present time a predominantly agrarian country with high level of economic inequality would remain prone to political turmoil unless the elite manages to modernize the economy and increase the living standards of the citizens.

This dissertation concentrates on five determinants out of six above stated. The sixth variable globalisation is beyond the scope of this paper. Globalisation is the only variable that is related to the external factors. This paper argues that the democratization of Kyrgyzstan is driven by the internal factors.

The paper focuses on Kyrgyzstan since it demonstrates a unique example of democratic development and could be useful experience for other countries. Here a process of democracy building coincided with a process of independent state building thus multiplying the challenges faced by the Kyrgyz government. The lack of historic, economic and social preconditions for democracy along with the engendered "free spirit and free expression" of Kyrgyz people (Beshimov 2008), who are former nomads and dwellers on the mountain-heights as before, explain why it is the most turbulent region in Central Asia. It is also should be mentioned that so far there has been little discussion of a theoretical framework while analysing democratisation in Kyrgyzstan.

The dissertation supports its theoretical assumptions with the empirical evidence. The sources include the academic journal articles, newspaper articles, academic books, reports of the independent non-governmental organizations, and the related Kyrgyz legislative acts. The information has been monitored and critically analysed starting from the moment when Kyrgyzstan attained its independency in August of 1991 and until July of 2010.

The structure of this paper is as follows. The first chapter introduces the theory of democracy and establishes why the theoretical framework by Acemoglu and Robinson is appropriate for the case of Kyrgyzstan; Chapter 2 explores the history of the country and development of its political institutions in the context of the theory applied; Chapter 3 examines the strength of Kyrgyz civil society and emphasises its role in democratic development of the state; Chapter 4 looks at economic part of the country development. The chapter emphasises the necessity of economic development for sustaining democracy. The concluding chapter sums up the analysis and considers the prospects for the future of democracy in Kyrgyzstan.

I. THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY

This chapter explores different theoretical concepts of what are the conditions for transition to democracy and its consolidating. The chapter first gives definitions of ‘democracy’ and ‘democratization’, then critically observes the main related school of thoughts and finally expands the theory by Acemoglu and Robinson underlying the arguments of this dissertation.

Beetham and Boyle (1995, p.1) define democracy as follows: “Democracy entails the twin principles of *popular control* over collective decision-making and *equality of rights* in the exercise of that control”. The fact that nowadays the majority of the countries are democracies corroborates the statement of Fukuyama (1992, p.42) that democracy is “the best form of government” so far. However Freedom House (2010 cited by Puddington 2010) classified 116 states out of 194 as electoral democracies in 2009, what means that they have not embraced those twin democratic principles in full.

In its turn democratization is a transition from non-democracy to democracy (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, p.175). Haynes and Crawford (2010) elaborated the notion stating that “democratization is the way democratic norms, institutions and practices evolve and are disseminated both within and across national and cultural boundaries”. Whereas Diamond (1999, p.20) underlined that “the essence of democratic consolidation is a behavioral and attitudinal embrace of democratic principles and methods by both elites and mass”. This transition towards consolidated democracy as ultimate outcome may have reversals and the case of Kyrgyzstan is one of the examples of such trajectory.

There are three main approaches to answer the question why democracy arises and why “democratization waves” have always been followed by reverse waves (Gill 2000, p.2; Pye 2000, p.25). The first approach is known as ‘culturalist’ began with Weber and his work *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (Beetham 1985). According to Weber (2003)

Protestant moral code based on the idea of moving away from dogmatism and rituals towards “hard work, asceticism and rational organization of one’s life in the service of God” stimulated the development of capitalism. Weber advocated democracy and he believed that a democratic regime can be established only under capitalist industrialization, in this view Weber suggested that Christianity, namely Protestantism, was conducive for establishing democracy (Lipset 1959, p. 46). This approach was advanced by Almond and Verba in their work *The Civic Culture* where they argued that certain type of culture, namely European, is a pre-requisite of stable democracy (Pye 2000, p.26). Though the civic, individualistic and rational values indeed lie in the core of European culture, this theory does not offer clear explanations of the causal links between cultural values and political outcomes (Gill 2000, p.2), furthermore the cultural variety of the existing democracies, for example India, Japan, contest the decisiveness of this factor. To this end, one should recall that Kyrgyzstan has lived with communist ideology for 70 years. Though the past nomadic life of the Kyrgyz created a culture with somewhat democratic features, yet their social organization based on kinship and tribal networks does not promote individual values. Finally, the dominant religion in Kyrgyzstan is Islam (however limited), which norms and values obviously quite alien to European culture. Therefore, the followers of “cultural preconditions” theory would hardly predict the rise of democracy in the Kyrgyz Republic.

The second and the leading approach is based on a premise that economic development is a main pre-requisite of democracy (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992, p.1; Gill 2000, p.3; Burnell 2001, p.191). The approach pioneered by Lipset tells “the more well to do the nation the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy” (Lipset 1959, p.54). Since economic development includes not only economic growth but social and technological progress as well (The World Bank Glossary 2004), it leads to deep changes in social structure and political culture (Sorensen 1991, p.2). The derivatives of economic development: higher level of education, lower socio-economic inequality, lower premium on political power as a result of general living standards increase, better ability of democratically elected government to cope with financial crisis build up

democratic political culture (Lipset 1959; Fukuyama 1992; Huntington 1991; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992; Gill 2000; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006).

Nevertheless, though the positive correlation between economic development and democracy has been validated by the vast empirical data, the causality between the two processes has not been proved. Countries like Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan have achieved high income per capita rate but remain undemocratic, the richest Latin American countries - Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil in the 1960-70s faced reversal of democracy, and India and Sri Lanka have succeeded to sustain democracy while remaining economically poor (Sorensen 1991, p.9; O'Donnell 1973 cited by Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, p.77; Diamond 1994, p.3; Birch 2007, p.128). In terms of democracy in Kyrgyzstan, it is worthwhile to say that the country is poor, the proportion of middle class is tiny, the economy is partly industrialized, and the only "pre-condition" which exists is a high literacy rate. Even so, it is hard to explain democratization in Kyrgyzstan on the basis of the given "modernization" theory.

Before proceeding to the third approach, it should be mentioned that last two decades, after the "third wave of democratization", the theoretic schools focusing on transitions from authoritarianism to stable and persistent democracy, the so called "transitions" schools, became dominant in academia unlike the above described schools using the "pre-conditions" approach which in the opinion of "transitionists" lacked the explanatory power (Collins 2006, p.9; Diamond 1999, p.65; Gill 2000, p.7).

The third approach related to the "transitions" schools is 'actor-centered'. It focuses on the politics of the elite (Gill 2000, p.7; Pye 2000, p.26). This 'actor-centered' approach was promoted by Rustow who put the leadership in the core of his democratic theory arguing that political elite can high-handedly set off democratization "irrespective of social, cultural, and economic conditions or historical legacies" (Collins 2006, p. 9). The followers of Rustow, Linz and Stepan also argued that democracy was not a consequence of socioeconomic development


but the outcome of politics of the relevant actors. They based their arguments on analysis of the collapse of democracies “as a result of the specific choices of the actors” (Linz and Stepan 1978 cited by Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, p.76). Having used the methodology of Linz and Stepan, O’Donnell and Schmitter produced their own theory of democratization where they distinguished the “Hardliners” and “Reformers” (“Softliners”) inside authoritarian block and “Moderates” and “Radicals” in opposition block. Thus the fate of democracy would depend on which of these four political actors would make an alliance (Przeworski 1991, p. 67). In their turn Rueschemeyer et al. also stressed the decisive role of actors both individual and collective. They argued that “it is power relations that determine whether democracy can emerge, stabilize and maintain itself” (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992, p.5) The supporters of this approach criticized the modernization theory as being too deterministic and not including the choice of the political elite at all (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, p.76).

The actor-centered theory totally downplays the role of cultural and economic pre-conditions which underpin the culturalist and modernization schools. The supporters of this theory also omit civil society as a democratic determinant what in view of Gill makes them unable to produce convincing explanation of democratization, since civil society “is instrumental in explaining the link between economic development and democracy” (2000, p.7). As Collins (2006, p. 9) adds that in case of Kyrgyzstan “its president Akayev and a handful of civil society activists were responsible for the democratization”. Furthermore, this actor-centered theory does not provide an explanation why some elites are able to consolidate their democratic or autocratic regimes and others are not. The two Kyrgyz revolutions ended the rule of authoritarian leaders whereas the changes in Constitution reflected the will of people to have a guarantee of future democratic policies, but this is exception to the rules in Central Asia.

This dissertation applies the framework by Acemoglu and Robinson which cannot be definitely related to the above listed school of thoughts. Its boundaries intersect the structuralist and actor-centered approaches. It is original, unique in terms of scope and provides well conceived

political-economy model explicating the causal link between the structural changes and the choice of the elite in the context of democratization, what can be applied to a great number of cases (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, p.85-87) . Acemoglu and Robinson described their theory in their book *Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy* where the researchers agreed with the mainstream opinion that economic development is one of the essential conditions for consolidating democracy because the costs of repression for the elite in industrialized, capital intensive economies with a presence of strong middle class are extremely high and it is simply not rational for the elite to resist democratization. It should be noted here that this does not provide a full answer why India (yet taking into account the presence of other democratic variables within this theory), an agrarian country with high social inequality, has managed to sustain democracy for the long time (Subramanian 2006, p.52). Also Acemoglu and Robinson (2006, p.86) obviously present the choices of the political elite as simply economic choices, they use the game theory to explain that the elites make (should make) decisions wherein they would be better off, thus they downplay the significance of any ideological motives of the elites, which might be a questionable issue. However, this stance well reflects the changes in politics of the Kyrgyz presidents, both of whom came to the power under democratic slogans and ended up in nurturing highly corruptive regimes.

As said in Introduction Acemoglu and Robinson's theory implies that democratization occurs when the elites include bigger part of the society in decision making process forced by significant social unrest or threat of revolution, what apparently resonates with the situation in Kyrgyzstan. In such circumstances the elite have to make promises about future politics and to make these promises credible they have to back them up by real concessions at the moment. For example they may introduce changes in Constitution as it happened in the Kyrgyz case. This process is depicted by the authors in the below diagram (2006, p. 176).





It was mentioned in Introduction that the process of redistribution of political power shown in the diagram above is subject to: the strength of civil society, the structure of political institutions, the nature of political and economic crisis, the level of economic inequality, the structure of economy, and the form and extent of globalization. Thus the given framework let us to outline the presence of which factors have influenced the decisions of the elite in Kyrgyzstan and examine to what extent democratization have embraced all spheres of the Kyrgyz people's life.

This theory suggests an absence of which of the abovementioned factors let the elite decide to overthrow democracy by using repressions or by mounting a coup in order to dismiss a democratic government (if they do not represent a ruling elite) and also explains because of which of the factors the elite fails to do so. Consequently it is possible to make empirical predictions for the future regime, whether it would be political instability, authoritarianism or consolidated democracy.

The following chapters of this dissertation examine the relationships between the elite and the citizens in Kyrgyzstan in the context of the above listed processes and show the applicability of the democratization diagram.

Conclusion

The overview of different democratic theories revealed that the framework by Acemoglu and Robinson represents an amalgamation of different democratic theories structured in a way that greatly facilitates to distinguish the cause-and-effect relations in democratic development. This dissertation shows that the theoretical assumptions resonate with the nature of relationship between the elite and the citizens in Kyrgyzstan. Moreover, the theoretical basis helps the dissertation to trace and scrutinize the process of democratization in the republic and make a reasonable forecast about the future of democracy in the country.

II. KYRGYZSTAN'S PASS OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

This largest chapter explores a historic background of the Kyrgyz Republic and its political development in the context of the theory applied. In particular, it describes the state building process and the political conditions preceding emerge of the democratic independent state. It also examines the dynamic of democratization during twenty years of the state independency, looks at the character of relationship between the elite and the citizens, and emphasises the resilience of local democratic political institutions.

The chapter firstly gives brief overview of the Republic. Secondly, it examines the development of the Kyrgyz nation in the period of the Soviet Union. Thirdly, it focuses on the politics of the new independent Kyrgyz state and examines the development of the Kyrgyz democratic political institutions.

The Kyrgyz Republic: Overview

A map of the Kyrgyz Republic (The WorldFactbook 2010)



The Kyrgyz Republic (KR) or Kyrgyzstan (the official short name) is a landlocked mountainous country located in the heart of Central Asia. Its total square area is 199.9 thousand km² where mountains make 93 per cent of its total territory. The country borders with China on the east and southeast, with Kazakhstan on the north, with Uzbekistan on the west and with Tajikistan on the south. Kyrgyzstan is notable for its beautiful nature consisting of many tall peaks, glaciers, green valleys, and high-mountain lakes. (The World Factbook 2010; The Embassy of the KR in the UK 2009; Ivasenko 2007).

The Kyrgyz Republic is a unitary, secular and democratic state. It is a multinational country where Kyrgyzs makes 64.9 per cent of total population, Uzbeks – 13.8 and Russians – 12.5 with additional Ukrainian, German, Kazakh, Tatar, Dungan, Ulgur and other ethnic minorities. The dominant religion is Islam. The state language is Kyrgyz and Russian has a status of official language. Administratively, Kyrgyzstan is subdivided to 7 oblasts (provinces): Batken, Dzhahal-Abad, Naryn, Osh, Talas, Chuy and Issyk-Kul (The Embassy of the KR in the UK 2009; The World Factbook 2010).

The country possesses enormous reserves of fresh water and hydroelectric potential, substantial deposits of gold, mercury, lead, tin, zinc, uranium, antimony and rare earth metals. Due to difficult terrain characteristics the natural resources are not easily accessible and their exploitation requires large foreign investments. Local industry and infrastructure sectors are

underdeveloped (Dabrowski and Antczak 1994, p.1). Per capita GDP is low and makes 2.100 US dollars as of 2009 (IndexMundi). According to the United Nations Human Development Report (2009) Kyrgyzstan falls into “Medium Human Development” category being placed on 120th place out of 182 countries.

The historic background: before and during the Soviet Union

The Kyrgyz, an admixture of people of Mongol and Turkic groups, were nomads for most of their history (Hiro 1994, p. 2). The distinctive Kyrgyz language and nationhood had developed in 15th century, but the Kyrgyz had never comprised a single centralized state during their pre-modern history. By 1860 all Kyrgyz tribes had accepted the Russian empire allegiance mainly on a voluntary basis to escape the oppression of the Kokand khanate (kingdom). After the Great October Revolution of 1917 and the rise of the Soviets to power, in 1918 the Kyrgyz territory was included in a new Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic within the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. Then during the national demarcation in 1924 a Kara-Kyrgyz Autonomous Oblast was created. In 1926 its status was changed into that of Kyrgyz Autonomous Republic. Finally in 1936 a full union republic – Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic was created. (Mambaeva 2008, p.11; Anderson 1999, p.9; Ivasenko 2007) Therefore as Huskey (2007, p.161) underlined “it was the Soviet Union that gave Kyrgyzstan a territory, an institutionalized ethnic identity, and the model of government with which it began life as an independent country”.

The Soviet achievements in industrialization and education spheres in Kyrgyzstan, according to the applied theory (and a majority of democratic theories would agree with this), have also underlain the current nascent Kyrgyz democracy. In 1920s the Soviet Union embarked on creating socialism through industrialization, collectivization and Cultural Revolution. In Kyrgyzstan by 1939 a literacy rate among people from 9 to 49 years old increased to 82 per cent, as of 1979 it achieved 99.8 per cent, and as of 2007 it made 99.3 per cent. During the Soviet rule the local popular education system was established. (Ivasenko 2007; ADB Fact sheet 2009) In its

turn industrialisation in Kyrgyzstan started from building up the extractive, manufacturing, light and food industries (ISAP 2010). The local hydro-electric potential began to be developed. In early 1930s Kyrgyzstan become an agrarian-industrial area with 23.5 per cent of industry share in total production volume. Development of social infrastructure was also notable (Anderson 1999, p.11).

It worth mentioning that collectivization was a main way to have the Kyrgyz shifted from nomad to settled agriculture. As Anderson noted, since members of the tribes had almost always built their houses side by side “collective farms often represented a simple restructuring of existing kinship groups whilst leaving many traditional authorities in place” (1999, p.12). Holding on traditions let the Kyrgyz to overcome the hardships connected with imposed collectivization and to preserve their cultural identity. The indirect rule through indigenous political appointees gave a reason to that Communist ideology in Kyrgyzstan as well as in other Central Asian countries was strong in form but less strong and more Asian in content (Collins 2006, p. 90-95). This could explain why the republic after the fail of the USSR did not stick to the communist form of government.

Despite the above mentioned socio-economic achievements, “the former Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic was one of the poorest regions of the USSR and the one most economically dependent on the centre”. The local industries were fully dependent on the central financing as by themselves they were of low profit. In 1988, due to the central planning 85 per cent of the Kyrgyz trade was inter-republican inside the Union borders (Dabrowski 1995, p.270).

In response to the stagnation in the USSR’ economic and political systems in the late 1980s Gorbachev, an incumbent Soviet leader, started his reforms promoting the *glasnost*’ and *perestroika*. The reforms reflected the moods in the Union’s republics as well as in Kyrgyzstan. In summer 1989 a substantial number of young people from periphery driven by the unemployment and housing crisis gathered in the capital Frunze and created the first significant

non-government social organization “Ashar” (Mutual help) which was registered in the republic. The Ashar conducted the series of mass protests calling for the allocation of land for them (Anderson 1999, p.19). Almost immediately in May 1990 the Kyrgyzstan Democratic Movement (KDM) was established. It developed into a significant political force with support in Kyrgyz Supreme Soviet (parliament) (History of Nations 2004). The movement was calling for the market reforms and genuine democratization and its membership reached 100,000 (Anderson 1999, p.19).

Glasnost’ and *perestroika* instigated the rise of ethnic nationalism in the country. In June 1990 a bloody conflict between the Kyrgyz and Uzbeks erupted in the southern Osh oblast of Kyrgyzstan. Despite the ethnic nature of conflict it was triggered by socioeconomic problems, in particular by the shortage of land. The violence was stopped with the intervention of the internal Kyrgyz and forwarded Soviet troops (Hiro 1994, p.133; Collins 2006, p.118).

Considering this tense situation in Kyrgyzstan the USSR president Gorbachev decided to create a new post of the executive president of the republic which would be chosen by the Kyrgyz Supreme Soviet deputies. Kyrgyzstan was the only country in Central Asia where as a result of the elections the incumbent Chairman of the Presidium of Supreme Soviet, conservative Musaliev, was not chosen for the job. Instead, they elected Askar Akayev, president of the republic's Academy of Science and the person who would promote democratic reforms and diminish the political control of the Soviet Communist party over the republic (Encyclopedia of the Nations 2010; Hiro 1994, p.133-134; Collins 2006, p.176-177).


The emerge of the independent state and democracy

Following the August coup in Moscow and a break-up of the USSR, on 31st of August 1991 Kyrgyz parliament adopted a “Declaration on state independence” which proclaimed the sovereignty of Kyrgyzstan. Soon, in a popular poll on 12th of October 1991 Akayev, the sole

candidate, was elected for the presidency this time of the independent republic gaining 98.5 per cent of votes. (Anderson 1999, p.21; Hiro 1994, p.137)

As is evident the democracy in post-soviet Kyrgyzstan emerged on the grounds of the preceding events. Such factors as the citizens' discontent over the politics, the economic hardships and inter-ethnic tensions had stipulated the decisions of the elite. The ideological beliefs of Akayev, who was acknowledged physical scientist and engaged in the party work shortly before the presidency, coincided with the citizens' need for changes. At the time the expectations of Kyrgyz society, where the Kyrgyz made only 52 per cent of the population (Anderson 1999, p.42), were high. It is unlikely that Akayev would be able to carry on the Soviet authoritarian politics in that situation. Speaking in the theory terms the cost of repressions would be too high for the elite. Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that neither the republic nor its president Akayev wanted a full independency from the Soviet Union at that moment. Kyrgyzstan became a democracy not as a result of the fight for it but for the collapse of the Union. The latter meets the theory's tenet that democratization is more likely to arise in a situation of economic or political crisis (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, p.32).

This dissertation argues that the process of modern political development of Kyrgyzstan fits well into Acemoglu and Robinson's democratization diagram (2006, p. 176).



As the theory states when the elite find that the further redistribution of power to the citizens poses a threat to their economic interests, they renege on their promises, roll back the democratic reforms and resort to repressions which costs seem to them limited. However, “when repressions fail, revolutions occur” (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, p.28) and the whole process depicted in

the diagram above starts all over again until democracy consolidates. The examples of rule of both Kyrgyz presidents and then of the provisional government demonstrate the validity of these theoretical assumptions.

Under early presidency of Akayev, Kyrgyzstan had made itself a name as an “island of democracy in a sea of dictatorships” or as the US Vice President Al Gore said a “bulwark of democracy in the region” (Kubicek 1998, p.36). Indeed the period from 1991 to 1994 can be characterised as of truly democratization. A multi-party democracy, independent media, non-governmental organizations and civil society were developing freely in Kyrgyzstan (ICG Report 2001, p.1). The government under the leadership of Akayev embarked on rapid liberalisation of economy, which included all basic prices liberalisation, introducing a national currency, intensive privatization of state-owned enterprises and other. “By 1995 according to the World Bank Kyrgyzstan had the most liberal economy in the CIS” (Kubicek 1998, p. 37).

It is interesting to note that Collins in her book (2006, p.177) argued that the first Kyrgyz President well knew that newly emerged independent republic cut off from the Soviet subsidies strongly needed foreign assistance and Western donors would rather support a democratic regime considering the fact that Kyrgyzstan had neither large energy resources nor some strategically important pipeline routes trespassing its territory like the neighbouring Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. In 1992 Kyrgyzstan became a member of the IMF, the World Bank, the UN, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and other numerous international organizations. The foreign assistance largely flowed into the republic. (Boehm 1996)

In 1991 Akayev in his speech described the country strategy as “development of private interests, private life, and private property based upon a strong civil society, guarantees of civil and political rights, ethnic harmony and social protection” (Anderson 1999, p.24). To establish the new political order a new constitution was adopted by the parliament on 5th of May 1993. The new constitution was a product of wide discussions in the public; a specially formed

Constitution Committee had been working from late 1992 to May 1993 to take into account the various opinions of the citizens. The constitution defined Kyrgyzstan as a “sovereign, unitary, democratic republic built upon the basis of legal, secular state” (Anderson 1999, p. 26). A new legislative body – Zhogorku Kenesh (Supreme Council) was established. The constitution sought to create a “balanced presidential democratic system” (Collins 2006, p.182) where Zhogorku Kenesh had the power to legislate, to approve key presidential appointments and to over-ride presidential vetoes of legislation. The president had the power to appoint the key officials with the approval of parliament, to initiate legislation and to dissolve parliament provided that was approved in a referendum. By Akayev’s initiative the constitution created a new judicial body, the Constitutional Court, to solve disputes between the legislature and the executive. (Anderson 1999, p. 27; Collins 2006, p. 183) Therefore the first Kyrgyz constitution entrenched the separation of powers into legislative, executive and judicial.

As Collins (2006, p.176) stated Kyrgyzstan at a minimum established an “electoral democracy” which in a view of Huntington included: “(1) free and fair elections, (2) democratic constitution with separation of powers, (3) full and equal citizenship, (4) autonomous political parties, (5) autonomous civil society and media, (6) economic liberalisation, and (7) civilian control of the military”.

Unfortunately later on Kyrgyzstan did not proceed with consolidation of its democracy. The democratic regime started to erode (Huskey 2007, p.161; Abdurahmon 2009). In December of 1995, Akaev was re-elected after a campaign when the most influential opposition candidates were disqualified from the elections shortly before the vote. As Beshimov (2007) argued “from 1995 the authorities use elections to strengthen their positions via manipulation of public conscience and behaviour, falsification and fraud”. In July 1998 the Constitutional Court resolved that Akaev was eligible to participate in the presidential elections again in 2000, despite the two-term limit in the 1993 constitution, since his first two elections in 1990 and 1991 took place under the old constitution (ICG Report 2001, p.4). The series of constitutional reforms held

in 1996 and 1998 weakened the legislative authority and accountability of the president respectively (Huskey 2007, p.161).

The situation became more complicated as notwithstanding that the government had pursued deep economic reforms and Kyrgyzstan became the first state in Central Asia which joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO), this did not “translate into the significant economic growth that would reverse the steady decline in the standard of living” (ICG Report 2001, p.1) A contribution to this fact had made the endemic corruption and nepotism. Akayev’s own family and his confidants were widely known for controlling the cadre appointments and using public assets for their private benefit (Collins 2006, p.226; ICG Report 2001, p.5-7).

According to Acemoglu and Robinson (2006, p.35) “if the elites have too much power in democracy, democracy will do little to improve the welfare of the majority. In this case the result will either be revolution or elite that keeps itself in power through repression”. Kyrgyzstan proved the reasonability of these words. Akayev had tightened his grip on power by using repressions against his political opponents and critical journalists who faced jailing and threatening (Collins 2006, p.241). Later in February 2005 his efforts to bring his immediate family into the parliament through gerrymandering provoked the intense mass protests.

On 24 March 2005 president Akayev was ousted as a result of a ‘Tulip Revolution’ labeled so in analogy with the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and the Rose Revolution in Georgia (Madlena 2010). Askar Akayev and his family flee the republic. A leader of the opposition forces Kurmanbek Bakiyev, a former prime-minister served under Akayev, headed a new government.

2005 - 2010 The rule of Bakiyev

A new president Bakiyev gained the trust of the citizens with the promises that he would dismantle the authoritarian family rule and restore the democratic regime in the country. But his commitment to democratization turned out to be extremely short-lived. In 2006 he had agreed to

hold a constitutional reform aiming to reinforce the legislature. However, already in 2007 despite the resistance of the opposition in parliament and public discontent the president managed to bring his own version of the new constitution through a referendum, which was marked by frauds and abuse of administrative resources (Tekebayev 2009). The draft of the constitution was analysed by the Venice Commission at a request of a speaker of the Kyrgyz parliament. In its opinion the Commission stated that the new constitution established an “indisputable supremacy of the President with respect to all other state powers” and as there were no “legal constraints on the powers of the President...the consequence might be that changes of power in the country would also in the future be based on revolutions and not on a peaceful and constitutional transfer of authority (The Venice Commission 2007).

Shortly after taking the post Bakiyev and his kin engaged in a new round of property division. In a view of Tekebayev (2009, p.4), a leader of Ata Meken opposition party, Bakiyev fully “privatized” the state authority. At the same time, the arrests of opposition leaders, restrictions on the media, assault on opponent civil activists became notorious (Tran 2010; ICG Report 2010). As Abdurahmon considers Bakiyev reneged on his promises and resorted to repression because he knew the citizens cannot organise the new mass protests soon again. “Poor economic potential of the country and very little middle class made repression affordable for the elite” (Abdurahmon 2010). Olcott (2005) believes that Central Asian presidents have been restraining political reforms because while being in the office they have made huge fortunes which they do not want to lose.

In July 2009 Bakiyev was re-elected to the presidency, with 76% of votes. The independent observers, European Network of Election Monitoring Organizations (ENEMO) reported the serious systematic violations in a course of the election and the Civil Organizations Alliance called the election “a sham” (Kislov 2009). Freedom House (2009 cited by Hiro 2009) reported that “President Bakiyev has become infamous for even greater levels of corruption, authoritarianism and ineffective policies than his predecessor”. The escalating public grievance

came to the boil when the utility prices had soared. On 7 April 2010 Bakiyev was swept away by a second Kyrgyz revolution instigated by the opposition forces. In contrast to a rather peaceful Tulip revolution, the second mass rebellion led to 85 deaths and hundreds of injured, as the government security forces had attempted to stop the opposition with the opening fire (ICG Timeline of Kyrgyzstan's history 2010).

The Provisional Government

On April 8, the opposition leaders formed a provisional government under the chairmanship of Roza Otunbaeva, an ex foreign minister served under Akayev and briefly under Bakiyev. The main task the public entrusted to the provisional government was to abolish the authoritarian family rule and prevent the emergence of a new autocrat. The government announced that it would stay in power for six months until the parliamentary and presidential elections. (Tran 2010; ICG Report 2010, p. 10)

In this uncertain political environment an inter-ethnic conflict between the Kyrgyz and Uzbeks broke out in the southern cities Osh and Jalalabad in mid June. The conflict had devastating repercussions causing thousands of deaths, around 400,000 Uzbeks were displaced. (ICG Timeline of Kyrgyzstan's history 2010) The provisional government accused Bakiyev and his subordinates in provoking and financing the conflict in order to disrupt the conduct of national referendum proving the legitimacy of the government and create the appropriate conditions for his return. In UN's opinion "the event was not a spontaneous inter-ethnic clash – that it was to some degree orchestrated, targeted and well planned" (Harding and Tran 2010). Late June the government had managed to cease the conflict. Shortly after that in order to confirm its legitimacy the provisional government decided to carry on with a referendum on adoption of a new constitution despite the existing tense situation.

The 2010 Constitution

On 27 June 2010, more than 90 per cent of Kyrgyz voters approved the new constitution thus Kyrgyzstan became the first Central Asian state with a parliamentary system of governance. Though the constitution did not establish a pure parliamentary system; it legitimized a shift from a presidential system toward a parliamentary one. Under the new constitution the power of the president is balanced by the power of a strong prime-minister chosen by the parliament. The president is limited to a single six year term without re-election possible. However, the president still has veto power and the ability to appoint the heads of the state bodies. The new constitution enlarges the parliament to 120 seats from the current 90 and limits any single political party to 65 of the seats. (Toktogulov and Boudreaux 2010; Radio Free Europe 2010; Al Jazeera 2010) Before the referendum the Interim Government had requested the Venice Commission to provide its opinion on the document. The Commission valued it positively stating that the constitution was democratic with priority given to the human and civil rights (The Free Library 2010).

The citizens had also agreed with that Otunbaeva would hold a post of presidency until 31 December 2011. Recently a newly formed legitimate government has announced that a new parliamentary election will be held on 10 October 2010. As of today 57 political parties have officially signed up for the election. In the absence of any obvious front-runner, the forthcoming election is going to be extremely competitive; the experts predict that a competition will be going among five - six parties (Toktonaliev and Kim 2010). Therefore, it is difficult to foresee the outcomes of the future parliamentary election, but no doubts it is critical for the country to have free, fair and peaceful election. Considering unpopularity of the government in the South of the country and the infighting within the government (Toktonaliev and Kim 2010; ICG Report 2010, p.11), there is a possibility of new mass uprising which can lead to long-term political turmoil and economic crisis respectively which would hold back the consolidation of democracy.

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that the democratic development in Kyrgyzstan can be well examined using the theoretical framework of Acemoglu and Robinson. Despite the difference in the length of their presidency, in general, both Kyrgyz rulers have followed one trajectory. Both Akayev and Bakiyev came into power under the slogan of democratization, both of them initiated some constitutional reforms to demonstrate their commitment and avoid civil unrest, while in the power both made the huge fortunes via controlling the distribution of resources, and then in order to keep that control they reneged on their promises to the citizens, rolled back the reforms and resorted to repressions, finally both miscalculated the costs of repressions and ended up being overthrown. The latest elite have transferred the power and redistributed the resources in favor of the citizens also under the threat of civil unrest, whereupon they also defined the scale of such democratic changes through designing the structure of political institutions in such a way that their economic interests would be taken into account. The policy of the provisional government is driven by a fear of third revolution; however the new constitution designed by the government preserves the institute of a relatively strong presidency. Therefore the elite's interests are less threatened and there is less chance they will use repressions. In such case, according to the theory, the democracy is likely to consolidate (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, p.33-34).

The chapter has pointed out to the endurance of democratic political institutions in Kyrgyzstan. The anti-democratic changes in the constitution forced by the elite had always provoked the intense public protests and all political concessions of the elite had always been driven by the threat of social unrest. The new Kyrgyz constitution is a leap forward towards a greater empowerment of the citizens and thus towards a consolidation of democracy.

To this one can add that the local elections have never met the international standards however as it seen the current political conditions are conducive for conducting more free and fair elections. This chapter has shown that democracy in Kyrgyzstan has become “the only game in town”, however the rules of the game have not been created yet.

III. BUILDING CIVIL SOCIETY IN KYRGYZSTAN

This third chapter explores the civil society as a determinant of consolidating democracy in Kyrgyzstan. According to the theory a civil society poses a potential threat of revolution to the elite, thus it ensures the persistence of democratization. A well-organized civil society is important for the creation of democracy in the first place as well as for its consolidation. In the presence of civil society the elites consider the repressions as more difficult and costly, furthermore in such society it is more difficult and costly to mount a coup against a democratic government (Acemoglu and Robinson (2006, p. 31). In this context Gill (2000, p.7) states that the “civil society is fundamental for the functioning of an effective democracy, and is instrumental in explaining the link between economic development and democracy”.

This chapter argues that the civil society has contributed to the consolidation of democracy in Kyrgyzstan. It also believes that the republic distinguishes by the pluralism and vibrant civil society to some extent thanks to its culture background. The chapter discusses different points of view on the role of civil society in consolidation of Kyrgyz democracy.

The chapter is structured as follows. Firstly, it reveals some ‘pro-democratic’ features of Kyrgyz culture. Secondly, it observes emerge of the civil society. Thirdly, it inspects the role of civil society in sustaining of democracy in the country by examining their involvement in the revolutionary events.

The role of Kyrgyz culture in emerge and consolidation of the democracy

As it was earlier mentioned, the Kyrgyz were nomads for the most of their pre-modern life. The nomadic lifestyle suggested the Kyrgyz people to have a certain social organization. As Anderson (1999, p. 2) stated “the Kyrgyz society was built around a distinctive political-administrative structure based upon independent family and tribal associations. Each family

belonged to a larger clan group, and each of these in turn was a part of a wider tribal confederation”. The clans, tribes generally defined their groups according to kinship identity ties. These ties have an enormous importance for the Kyrgyz as well as for other Central Asian people (Collins 2006, p.17-19).

Many researchers, such as Anderson (1999, p. 2), Beshimov (2008), Olcott (2005, p.186) agree that the nomadic traditions have contributed to the more pluralistic nature of the Kyrgyz society. The tribal life suggested a degree of debate, consultation and flexibility in the selection of leaders which was quite alien to their settled neighbors (Anderson 1999, p.2). For example, ‘Kurultai’ (Assembly) is the oldest Kyrgyz tradition of solving the most important public problems like electing khans and resolution of conflicts through the discussions between representatives of the tribes (Kenensariyev, 2009). Nonetheless, as Anderson (1999, p.2) points out this should not be overstated as the leaders had always been selected from the most powerful and better-off tribes. However, the Kurultai - Assembly of the Kyrgyz Peoples is up to now a functioning organization which makes possible for representatives of the state officials, non-governmental organizations, ethnic diaspora, Mass Media and individual citizens to discuss the political agenda publicly. The Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic (2010, article 52) states that the conclusions of Kurultai serve as recommendations to the related bodies.

However Boehm (1996) and Collins (2006) pointed out to that Kyrgyz ‘civic’ culture is hardly seen as such from the Western point of view since the “regionalistic, clan-like and tribalistic patterns of political loyalty are still very strong” (Boehm 1996). Indeed, along with the separation into tribes, an affiliation of a person or a group to the Northern or Southern part of the country has an important role which defines the interrelations among the people on a republic scale (Moldobaev 2010; Alkan 2009, p.356; Ryabkov 2008, p.301). The roots of this cleavage stem from the time when under influence of the Kokand’s khanate the southern Kyrgyz had shifted to a sedentary life sooner than the northern ones. They were deeply involved in the khanate’s economic and political life unlike the northerners who belonged to it only formally and

lived autonomously (Moldobaev 2010; Pannier 2010). This division has its political and economic repercussions. Up to the present day, the high-ranking officials tend to build the government system on the ground of nepotism and localist networks (Moldobaev 2010). The cleavage is strengthened by the fact that the North is a main industrial area and the South is an agricultural one. In addition, the North represents a more russified or Europeanized part of the country and the South is under influence of the Uzbek minority residing there (Pannier 2010).

According to the employed theory the societies where the political identities and cleavages on the basis of class have been crosscut by the cleavages on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion or region, i.e. pluralistic societies is more likely to have consolidated democracies. This is attributed to that “the many different cleavages stop a broad coalition in favor of redistribution emerging” thus “elites would have little to fear from majority rule” (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, p.43). As seen Kyrgyz society fits into the pluralistic society with greater chances to sustain democracy. However, one may suggest that the division of country in two parts may be a factor which is reinforcing the tensions and thus leading to a political instability, but the experts believe this should not be over exaggerated as the cleavage is not fundamental (Moldobaev 2010; Pannier 2010). As Ryabkov (2008, p.313) argues “the north–south cleavage at the level of elites, however complicated, is not reproduced at the level of political attitudes of the population”. It is true that the main constituency of northerner Akayev was the population of the North and respectively Bakiev had the support of the South, but the today’s government consists both of the northern and southern regions’ representatives. The remarkable fact is that president Otunbaeva, who is a native of the South, is not popular among the southern electorate and her main support comes from the North (Toktonaliev and Kim 2010).

As for the role of religion in the Kyrgyz culture, at present time though nominally nearly everyone in Kyrgyzstan is Muslim, their religious observance is weak, as well as their identification with the rest of the Islamic world (Mandelbaum 1994, p.9). This comes from the fact that the Kyrgyz were converted to Islam much later than their settled neighbors and they

mixed it with their previous creed Shamanism, and then under the Soviet rule the religion was kept to a nominal. However, the southern provinces bordered by Uzbekistan tend to be more Islamised in contrast to the northern ones. (Mambaeva 2008, p.6-10; Huskey 2003, p.118; Hiro 1994, p.135; Anderson 1999, p.3)

The emerge of civil society

From the beginning of his rule Akayev stressed the necessity of a strong civil society to create the full liberal democracy. (Anderson 2000, p.83, Collins 2006, p.186) The Akayev's appeal was caught on by the public and a broad range of social organisations and open media appeared soon. By 1993 there were 250 registered social organisations and by 1997 already about 1000. Though only 20 per cent of them continued to function and also many of them duplicated the activities of others. The most of the organisations dealt with welfare, gender, HIV/AIDS, the environment and agricultural support. (Anderson 1999, p. 32; Anderson 2000, p. 84; Baisalov and Sasykbaeva 2005) The local media began to develop more independent and critical position towards the government. Such newspapers as *Svobodnye Gory* and *Res publica* were the harshest opponents of the president Akayev's rule (later they would be closed down by the government) (Anderson 1999, p. 29). It is remarkable that Kyrgyzstan was the only country in Central Asia where Freedom House opened their own printing house (Freedom House 2003). According to Counterpart Consortium none of the Kyrgyz NGOs reported interference from the government before 1995 and according to the Kyrgyz Bureau of Human Rights there were almost no human rights violations until late 1994 (Collins 2006, p.187). As Anderson (1999, p.32) argued "during the early 1990s an embryonic, modern civil society was gradually emerging within Kyrgyzstan".

As for the political pluralism, in 1991 – 1995 the parties had enjoyed political openness and support of the regime. Though the lack of experience and more moral than financial government's support made it difficult for the political parties to build up. In 1994 parliamentary election, only 23 of the total of 105 deputy seats went to candidates running as party members, the majority seats went to the independent candidates, although 12 registered parties competed. (Collins 2006,

p.232) However, the parties of various political beliefs sprang up in 1990s including the most prominent opposition parties like Ata Meken, Asaba, Ekryn Kyrgyzstan, Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan and others. (Anderson 1999, p.34-37)

At the present time there are more than hundred of the political parties registered with the Ministry of Justice (Kalem 2010), but it is important to note that despite the fact that political parties proliferate in Kyrgyzstan they are centered on the personalities not on the party programs. The Kyrgyz citizens heavily rely on individuals who head the parties; they have not yet developed a sense of party identification (Anderson 1999, p.37; Bogatyrev et al. 2006; Beshimov 2008). Since the new constitution stipulates the parliamentary elections are to be held on a proportional basis (The Constitution of the KR 2010, article 70) this would substantially increase the role of the political parties and the level of competition between them respectively. It is safe to assume that this change would force the parties to build up their ideological stance, institutional structure, principles of cadre rotation in other words to move up to the higher level of institutional development. However, at the moment the “society cannot claim the presence of a multi-party system in a full sense” (Ormonbekov 2007).

The role of civil society in the democracy consolidation

As it known from the midst of 1990s the regime of Akayev was transforming into more and more authoritarian which eventually led to the “Tulip Revolution” in 2005. His follower Bakiyev repeated his fate in 2010. In both times the reasons for social discontent were endemic corruption, the elite’s control over the resources and increasing inequality along with the repressions against the opposition leaders, critical journalists, and human rights NGO representatives. Since both authoritarian rulers Akayev and Bakiev were ousted as a result of mass uprising, it may be suggested that the civil society was heavily involved in the mass mobilization and thus in the restoration of the democracy. However, the experts have different opinions on the role of local civil society organisations in the revolutions. For example, Paasiaro (2009, p.59) stated that the “NGOs played a minimal role in the events that led to the downfall of

President Akaev” referring to Radnitz (2006), Heathershaw (2007), and Lewis (2008). In contrast to that Temirkulov (2010, p. 589) argued that “the Tulip revolution of 2005 was carried out as the concerted action of varied political forces and NGOs”.

According to Temirkulov (2010, p.593) the Tulip revolution was a result of the joint actions of opposition parties, NGOs and informal networks (patronage networks and traditional institutes). These various forces formed the People’s Union with an aim to overthrow president Akayev. In this union NGOs, such as the Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society (CDCS) and the Civil Society against Corruption (CSAC), were the defenders of the rights of the participants; they provided the institutional and organisational support (Bingol 2006, p.78-79; Temirkulov 2010, p. 594).

In his comparative analyses of Kyrgyz revolutions Temirkulov (2010, p.589) stated that the upheaval in 2010, unlike the Tulip revolution, was a result of spontaneously mobilised mass shocked at news about killings of the civilians by the government security forces. The event was preceded by the threats of opposition parties to Bakiev to hold a “countrywide national Kurultai with the unique agenda: restoration of the people’s power” which led to a series of arrests of the opposition leaders. In response to that hundreds of the supporters of the opposition gathered at Bishkek’s central square where they clashed with the police. Then the information about shooting at the protesters led to the mobilisation of the masses of people before the Government House and the subsequent overthrow of Bakiyev. (Temirkulov 2010, p.596-598)

In its turn Paasiaro (2009) gave its own assessment of the Kyrgyz civil society. He stated that despite that USAID [United States Agency for International Development] and Counterpart International reported that an active civil society had been successfully established in Kyrgyzstan, the other critical studies concluded that the local NGOs only involved in promoting Western ideological agenda and aid distribution for they were highly dependent on donor sponsorship. This means that citizen empowerment and democratic consolidation cannot be

achieved through NGOs (Paasiaro 2009, p. 59). However, Paasiaro argued that Kyrgyz civil society was genuine and that the donors' support gave the individual NGO activists "the opportunity to pursue their own social and political development agendas" and "develop the home-grown strategies through which the grassroots interests were represented to decision-makers" (2009, p.59). He suggested that it was quite probable that the strategies of local NGO activists could be more adopted to the Kyrgyz reality and thus more efficient than those envisaged by the Western experts. As an example Paasiaro brought an anti-HIPC campaign when several prominent NGOs, led by famous human rights campaigner Aziza Abdrasulova, publicly protested against the Highly Indebted Poor Country Initiative promoted by the World Bank and IMF (Paasiaro 2009, p.68)

Finally, Olcott (2005, p.310) argued that the nongovernmental sector in Kyrgyzstan was organized better than in other Central Asian countries and it played an important role in increasing the public expectations in regard to the government's responsibility during the elections and in general context. She (Olcott 2000, p.314) considers that the democracy consolidation in Kyrgyzstan depends on the commitment of pro-government reformers, and on the pressure from the civil society challenging the government.

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that cultural and historic background of the Kyrgyz, particularly, such traditions in nomadic Kyrgyz tribes as "freedom of thinking, freedom of movement and the tradition of selecting leaders in popular gatherings" (Juraev 2008, p.258) have contributed to emerge of the civil society. From the other side it is seen that the same culture supposes the strong kinship, clan networks and regionalism which may encourage the persistence of corruption. Moreover, it is probable that such informal networks may inhibit the consolidating of the central power thus leading to the political instability.

The chapter has shown that the civil society in Kyrgyzstan is an established part of the society however far it is from a Western model. The civil society now is better organized and well aware that it can influence and oppose the authoritarian state. It can be assumed that the presence of the civil society makes the new ruling elite consider the repressions as more difficult and costly, therefore the democracy is more likely to consolidate.

IV. THE ECONOMY OF INDEPENDENT KYRGYZSTAN

The structure of the economy or economic institutions influences the elite's trade-off between democracy and non-democracy. This is so because "first, the structure of the economy influences the costs of revolution, repression or coups, and second it influences the nature of redistributive politics" (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, p. 287).

This chapter observes the economy of Kyrgyzstan to prove an argument that economic development is necessary to consolidate democracy. The elite in Kyrgyzstan resorted to the repressions since they were affordable from their point of view. The costs of repressions, revolutions and coups are extremely high in a modern capitalist economy where relationships are based on trust and cooperation (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, p. 289). In the predominantly agrarian country the elite did not have their substantial investments in physical and human capital which could be endangered by the repressions. As for the citizens, the high level of poverty and economic inequality made their choice of the revolutions affordable for them.


The chapter is structured as follows. It first examines the economic institutions established in the country since 1991 and the general growth indicators, then the chapter observes the structure of the economy and finally looks at the economic inequality.

The economic institutions

After the collapse of the USSR, Kyrgyzstan had to build a completely new economic system. Considering its limited resources potential, except gold, water and great natural beauty, the government under the leadership of president Akayev embarked upon the radical liberal economic reforms with the aim to attract foreign investments and boost the economic growth in the country (Anderson 1999, p. 65). The reforms included development of new private sector, elimination of price control, privatization, introduction of a national freely convertible currency, and reduction in state subsidies. In this regard Abdrisaev et al. (2010) mentioned that “compared to its neighbours Kyrgyzstan was, and remains, far ahead in market reforms”. However, the rapid economic reforms did not produce the expected economic outcomes in this poor mountainous, agrarian country with no experience of free market economics. The task was complicated by the fact that the new market economy had to be created on the basis of the inherited Soviet economy. Furthermore, Kyrgyzstan had been one of the poorest of the Soviet Union republics and the one most economically dependent on the centre (Dabrowski et al. 2005). In 1991 the Kyrgyz GNP per capita made USD 1.550 (meanwhile it was USD 2.470 in Kazakhstan), 98% of the trade was inter-republican in accordance with the central planning, and 12 per cent of the national budget were the transfers from the union budget (Anderson 1999, p.67). Consequently, the following withdrawal of state subsidies from Russia and the abruption of trade connections left a huge hole in Kyrgyz budget.

Besides not all the reforms could facilitate the economic development in the country at least in a short time. For example, in 1998 Kyrgyzstan became famous as the first Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) country to be accepted in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Consequently Kyrgyzstan’s trade with CIS countries was immediately hit by 200% tariffs existing up to now. It was a huge setback for the Kyrgyz economy, especially for small business (Abdrisaev et al. 2010)

Table 1. GDP annual rate change for 1991-2007 (Asanalieva 2006, p.20)



The table above shows that the economy of the Kyrgyz Republic has not recovered to the 1991 year level yet. The analysis of GDP dynamic shows that the economy was undergoing a period of long-term decline and stagnation. The level of GDP in 2007 against 1991 is 89.4%. (Asanalieva 2006, p.20) In 2007-2008 the GDP grew about 8% annually, partly due to higher gold prices, but in 2009 because of the global financial crisis and the following declines in remittances and investment GDP fell 1% (The World FactBook 2010). Here it is important to note that the country's biggest gold mine – Kumtor mine - is a “primary source of gold and the primary engine behind the country's overall GDP growth”, without it the country would have a very low 3-3.5% of GDP growth per year (IHS Global Insight Report 2010) thus the country highly depends on the gold production volume and on the fluctuation of prices for gold internationally. It is also worth mentioning that 19% of the budget in 2008 represented the remittances sent by Kyrgyz labour migrants to home (The World Bank 2009). The latter fact again points out to the vulnerability of the national economy.

However, prior to the overthrow of president Bakiyev in April and the inter-ethnic conflict in June 2010, Kyrgyz economy was on a recovery path from the global economic crisis, with GDP projected to rise by 4.5 per cent in 2010 (ADB et al. 2010, p.7). This growth was supported by a sharp rise in prices for energy use which consequently have triggered the mass protests. According to the ADB, IMF and WB joint report (2010, p.13) the events of April and June resulted in a reduction in economic activity this year by 3.5 per cent. The donors' report stated the agricultural activity is expected to decline by 12 per cent in 2010 due to the disruption in

agricultural work and trading in the south, and moreover a majority of large investors postponed their original investment plans for the uncertain political situation.

On July 27 in response to the government appeal the international donor community agreed to provide a total aid of about \$1.1 billion over the next 30 months; and of this amount, about \$650 million was earmarked for the remaining months 2010, which is a significant and rapid support (IMF 2010). It is crucial that the new government of Roza Otunbaeva is to use these funds in the most efficient way and in line with their declared anti-crisis plan (Kab 2010) thus enhancing the trust of the citizens to the elite.

The economic structure

Modern developed industrialised economy distinguishes by complex buyer and supplier networks, mutual trust and big reliance on investments in human capital. Thus the costs of repressions and coups in such economy would be very high. The economic structure also stipulates the attitude of the elite to democracy. In agrarian countries the elite is mostly represented by the landowners who would be resistant to redistribution of power as the land unlike human capital is easy to tax and social inequity will likely to be reduced by greater tax on land. (Acemoglu and Robinson 2008, p.288-289)

As seen from the below table Kyrgyz economy relates to the agrarian type. In 1990 a share of industry in the total production volume made 26.4%, in 2007 it decreased to 13.6% thus the negative tendency of deindustrialization of the Kyrgyz economy is observed (Asanalieva 2006, p. 23)

Table 1. Kyrgyz economy structure in 1990 and 1995-2007, % of GDP (Asanalieva 2006, p. 22)

	1990	1995	1996	1997	1999	2001	2003	2005	2006	2007
Industry	26,4	12	11,1	16,5	21,7	23,1	17,3	17,3	14,9	13,6
Agriculture	32,7	40,3	45,8	40,8	34,8	34,5	33,6	28,5	28,7	29,0

Construction	7,7	6,1	6	4,5	3,1	3,8	2,9	2,7	2,7	3,4
Services	30,0	34	30,1	30,3	33,3	31,4	36,8	40,7	41,2	41,1
Other	3,2	7,6	7	7,9	7,1	7,1	9,4	10,8	12,2	16,9

Nevertheless, the table above shows that the services comprise the biggest share of the GDP. The services mainly represented by tourism, education, health care, transport and communications (Asanalieva 2006, p.23).

The elite in Kyrgyzstan cannot be described as huge landowners; land is not their primary source of income. One should remember that the country has scarce land resources and moreover, two-thirds of the poor and the extreme poor live in rural areas, the agriculture is a low profitable activity in Kyrgyzstan (ADB et al. 2010, p. 72). As was said earlier the ousted elite was benefitting for the full control over the distribution of resources in the country in general, and in particular, the elite was known for the control of foreign grants, credits and investments distribution (Olcott 2005; Tekebaev 2009). However, it is apparent that low industrialisation of the economy decreased the cost of repressions for the elite.

The economic inequality

The low level of income inequality is essential for the consolidation of democracy. According to Asemoglu and Robinson the presence of strong middle class in society is crucial because of the following reasons. First, when the elites have to extend their power, their first choice would be the middle class, thus a partial democracy can be created; second, the enfranchised middle class may promote pro-poor politics thus incorporate the interests of all population in decision-making; third, the middle class “can act as a buffer between the rich and the poor” by ensuring that the politics is moderate; fourth, when “middle class is in power together with the rich” it can restrain repressions and favor the democratization (2008, p.259).

As of 2008, 36.8% out of the total population in Kyrgyzstan lived in poverty and 7.7% lived in extreme poverty (ADB et al. 2010, p.72). The difference in income between the tiny part of the reach and poor is dramatic, and the middle class is too small to influence the politics of the elite (Sanghera 2010). In this regard Abdurahmon's (2009) stated that a "very little middle class made repression affordable for the new ruler (Bakiyev) and prevented the consolidation of democracy in Kyrgyzstan". It is also believed that economic inequality in Kyrgyzstan, or in other words a widespread poverty, is one of the main reasons underlying the revolutions and the inter-ethnic conflict (Sanghera 2010; Reeves 2010).

Conclusion

Despite to some discrepancy with the theory's assumption about that the elite resistant to democracy usually comprise from landowners, this chapter has shown that in line with the theory the elite in the weak and underdeveloped Kyrgyz economy considered the cost of repressions as limited, and thus more preferable than democratization. Besides this, the process of deindustrialization, the long period of low economic growth, the high level of inequality, the disruption of economic activity in the South of the country, the suspension of foreign investments, hence the economic crisis coupled with the political makes the country exposed to the political instability. Particularly, the opposition elite could attempt to overthrow the current pro-democratic government or a part of the population may start to associate democracy with a disorder and economic crisis what as a result could suspend the consolidation of democracy.

CONCLUSION

This dissertation has argued that Kyrgyzstan is at present an electoral democracy which is undergoing a process of consolidation. This stance is based on the analysis of a process of

democratisation in Kyrgyzstan, namely the incorporation of a bigger amount of people in decision-making through limiting the power of the president and broadening the authority of the Parliament. It has been observed that this process of redistribution of the power and resources between the elite and the citizens took place in the presence of significant social unrest and when the elite considered the cost of democracy as limited. This conflict between the elite and the citizens was stipulated by the following internal factors: the created democratic political institutions, the political and economic crises and the relatively strong civil society.

The dissertation has shown that the democratic political institutions created in Kyrgyzstan are resilient. It could be said that democracy became “the only game in town” in Kyrgyzstan because the citizens tend to lock-in the democratic institutions to guarantee their rights and participation in the politics in the future. The revolutions in 2005 and 2010 demonstrated that the democratic regime in Kyrgyzstan is protected by its citizens. It was revealed also that the political and economic crisis followed by the second revolution and the intense inter-ethnic conflict predetermined the decision of the elite to hold an unprecedented within Central Asia referendum on the constitutional changes which transformed the country from presidential to parliamentary. The paper also showed how important was the role of the civil society in maintaining the democratic regime in the country. Moreover, it was stated here that the cultural background of the Kyrgyz facilitated emerge of the civil society and the democracy in general.

The dissertation also stated that the previous ruling elite in Kyrgyzstan reneged on their pro-citizen promises and resorted to repressions because the high level of economic inequality and the structure of the economy made the cost of repressions limited for them. If the current level of inequality and the structure of economy remain unchanged the elite will have economic incentives to overthrow the democratic regime in the future. Thus there is a threat that a new government of Kyrgyzstan would renege on their promises and follow the path of their predecessors. However, taking into account that the acting government does not have an overwhelming popular support, particularly it is not popular in the South of the country, and

there is a strong possibility of new social unrest or an attempt of a political coup since the parliamentary elections could quite possibly provoke mass protests from a side of the disagreed with the results citizens, one should remember that the forthcoming parliamentary elections will be the first of such level of competition in the Kyrgyz history, it can be assumed that the government would keep on their democratic commitments.

It is interesting to note that the authors of the applied theory Acemoglu and Robinson have written very rationalistic story, they say that the elite would do what is in their best economic interest therefore they would go for any concessions to sustain their power and avoid revolution. Actually the Kyrgyz history showed that the elite could not “calculate” the right time for the concessions and as a result they faced revolutions. The similar scenario when the democracy was undermined and then restored back went on for many years in other countries also, for example, in Argentina. Nevertheless, it is seen that due to the discussed factors the elite in Kyrgyzstan can hardly create a sustainable autocracy. Besides the revolutions is a historic memory for this very young independent country which is in the process of its state building.

Having considered the above mentioned determinants it is possible to predict that the Kyrgyz nascent democracy is not likely to collapse and the country would not downslide into authoritarianism since the basic democratic institutes like separation of powers and civil society entrenched in the Kyrgyz society. Relying on the theory this dissertation concludes that Kyrgyzstan is in the process of consolidating its democracy, however the country is likely to remain prone to political instability until its economic conditions would be improved.

Thus the dissertation revealed the internal factors which affect the consolidation of democracy in Kyrgyzstan. It should be noted that the discussion of the prospects of democracy in the country should be continued with examining globalisation as a democracy determinant in accordance to the theory. Globalisation could make a difference in a politically and economically liberal Kyrgyzstan. Furthermore, the dissertation has observed the importance and persistence of the

informal networks/politics in the Kyrgyz society thus the further research on their influence on a decision making should be done.

References:

Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J., 2006. *Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Abdurahmon, A., 2009. Democracy in Kyrgyzstan – did it come too early and is it too expensive to afford? [online] Available from:

<file:///localhost/C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Administrator/Desktop/MA/Dissertation/KG/Democracy%20in%20Kyrgyzstan%20-%20did%20it%20come%20too%20early%20and%20is%20it%20too%20expensive%20to%20afford.mht> [Accessed 1 July 2010].

http://www.adb.org/Documents/Fact_Sheets/KGZ.pdf

Al Jazeera, 2010. New Kyrgyz constitution approved [online]. Available from:

<http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2010/06/201062873510612781.html> [Accessed 1 July 2010].

Alkan, H., 2009. Post-Soviet politics in Kyrgyzstan: between centralism and localism? *Contemporary Politics*, 15: 3.

<http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713411554>. 1 July 2010

Anderson, J., 1999. *Kyrgyzstan: Central Asia's Island of Democracy?* Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers.

http://english.pravda.ru/hotspots/conflicts/29-06-2010/114049-kyrgyz_parliament-0

Balmasov, S. Pravda.Ru

Kyrgyz Parliament To Replace Both President and Court

29.06.2010

Beetham, D. and Boyle, K., 1995. *Introducing Democracy: 80 Questions and Answers*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Beshimov, B., 2008

Beshimov, B., 2007. *Was there an 'island of democracy' in Central Asia?* [online].

Bishkek, Institute for Public Policy. Available from: <http://www.ipp.kg/en/analysis/601/> [Accessed 17 August 2009]

Birch, A., 2007. *The Concepts and Theories of Modern Democracy*. London: Routledge.

- Bingol, Y., 2006, The 'Colorful' Revolution of Kyrgyzstan: Democratic Transition or Global Competition? *Turkish Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 5, No.1&2
- Boehm 1994
- Collins, K., 2006. *Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Dabrowski, M. et al., 1995. 'Economic reforms in Kyrgyzstan', *Post-Communist Economies*, 7: 3 [online]. Available from: <http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713440896> [Accessed 1 July 2010].
- Dabrowski, M. and Antczak, R., 1994. 'Economic reforms in Kyrgyzstan'. CASE - Center for Social and Economic Research
- Diamond, L., 1999. *Developing Democracy Towards Consolidation*. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press.
- Fukuyama, F., 1992. *The end of history and the last man*. London: Penguin Books.
- Gill, G., 2000. *The Dynamics of Democratization: Elites, Civil Society and the Transition Process*. London: Macmillan Press.
- Ivasenko, L., 2007. *AllKyrgyzstan*. The history of Kyrgyzstan (История Кыргызстана) [online]. Available from: <http://www.allkyrgyzstan.com/kyrgyzstan/history.htm> [Accessed 1 July 2010].
- IndexMundi 2010. Kyrgyzstan GDP - per capita (PPP) [online]. Available from: [http://www.indexmundi.com/kyrgyzstan/gdp_per_capita_\(ppp\).html](http://www.indexmundi.com/kyrgyzstan/gdp_per_capita_(ppp).html) [Accessed 1 July 2010].
- Institute for strategic analysis and prognosis (ISAP) 2010. [online]. Available from: <http://www.easttime.ru/countries/topics/1/4/31.html>
- International Crisis Group (ICG) Asia Report, 2001. *Kyrgyzstan at Ten: Trouble in the "Island of Democracy"* [online], No 22. Available from: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3bd973a20.html> [Accessed 1 August 2010]
- International Crisis Group (ICG) Asia Report, 2008.
- International Crisis Group (ICG) Asia Report, 2010

- Hurding and Trank, 2010. Kyrgyzstan violence: UN official accuses outside groups of planning attacks. *Guardian.co.uk*. Available from:
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jun/16/kyrgyzstan-violence-un-accuses-outsiders>
[Accessed 1 August 2010]
- Hiro, D., 1994. *Between Marx and Muhammad: The Changing Face of Central Asia*. London: Harpers Collins Publishers.
- Huskey, E., 2003. *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*. National identity from scratch: Defining Kyrgyzstan's role in world affairs. 19-3 [online]. Available from:
<http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713635808>
[Accessed 1 July 2010].
- Huskey, E., 2007. Eurasian semi-presidentialism: the development of Kyrgyzstan's model of government in Semi-presidentialism outside Europe: A comparative study. Ed. Elgie, R. and Moestrup, S. New York: Routledge.
- Juraev, Shairbek (2008) 'Kyrgyz democracy? The Tulip Revolution and beyond', *Central Asian Survey*, 27: 3, <http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713409859>
- Kenensariyev, T., 2009. The thoughts about Kurultai agreement («Думы о Курултае Согласия») [online]. Available from:
<http://thepotterswheelcoffeehouse.com/index.php?mode=newsOut&newsId=814> [Accessed 10 August 2010].
- Kubicek, P., 1998. Authoritarianism in Central Asia: curse or cure? *Third World Quarterly*, 19: 1, [online]. Available from:
<http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713448481> [Accessed 1 August 2010]
- Lipset, S., 1959. *Political Man*. London: Mercury Books.
- Madlena, C., 2010. Kyrgyzstan Analysis: What Brought On the Colorless Revolution? <http://enduringamerica.com/2010/04/09/kyrgyzstan-analysis-what-brought-on-the-colourless-revolution-madlena/>
- Mandelbaum, M., 1994. *Central Asia and the world: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press.

- McMann, K., 2004. *The Civic Realm in Kyrgyzstan: Soviet Economic Legacies and Activists' Expectations in The Transformation of Central Asia: states and societies from Soviet rule to independence*. Ed. Luong, P. New York: Cornell University Press
http://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=KefvEz9bfyEC&oi=fnd&pg=PP11&dq=Soviet+Economic+Legacies+and+Activists%27+Expectations&ots=ckBv8-SDnO&sig=EjUGGX_rTPoXEB4UzamdYCPyaRI#v=onepage&q=Soviet%20Economic%20Legacies%20and%20Activists'%20Expectations&f=false
- Moldobaev, A., 2010. *Prudent Solutions Analytical Centre*. What separates North and South of Kyrgyzstan? (Что разделяет Север и Юг Киргизии?) [online]. Available from:
<http://www.analitika.org/article.php?story=20100628130515530> [Accessed 10 August 2010].
- Olcott, M., 2005. *Central Asia's Second Chance*. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Ormonbekov J., 2007. *Mythology of political parties in Kyrgyzstan* [online]. Available from:
<http://www.ipp.kg/en/analysis/514/> [Accessed 17 August 2009]
- Recknagel, C., 2010. How strong is Kyrgyzstan's new Constitution? [online]. Radio Free Europe.
- Available from:**
http://www.rferl.org/content/How_Strong_Is_Kyrgyzstans_New_Constitution/2087294.html?page=1&x=1#relatedInfoContainer [Accessed 17 August 2009]
- Sorensen, G., 1991. *Democracy, Dictatorship and Development: Economic Development in Selected Regimes of the Third World*. London: Macmillan Press Ltd.
- Pannier, B., 2010. Kyrgyzstan: One country or two? [online]. Available from:
<http://politicom.moldova.org/news/kyrgyzstan-one-country-or-two-208492-eng.html>
- Pye, L., 2000 *Democracy and Its Enemies in Pathways to Democracy: The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions*. Ed. Hollifield, J. and Jillson, C. London: Routledge.
- Przeworski, A., 1991. *Democracy and the market: political and economic reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Rueschemeyer, D. et al., 1992. *Capitalist Development and Democracy*. Cornwall: Polity Press.

The Free Library, 2010. Venice Commission positively values new draft of Kyrgyz Constitution. <http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Venice+Commission+positively+values+new+draft+of+Kyrgyz+Constitution.-a0228296709>

Текебаев, О., 2009. "Реформы" от Акаева до Бакиева. Президент Кыргызстана приватизирует государственную власть" *Ata Meken Internet Newspaper*.

http://atamekenkg.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=433:-qq-q&catid=99:politic&Itemid=29

Toktogulov, K. and Boudreaux, R., 2010. *Kyrgyz voters endorse new constitution*. [online].

Wall Street Journal. Available from:

<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703964104575334083904710678.html>

[Accessed 5 May 2010].

Transparency International 2010. Corruption Perceptions Index 2009 [online]. Available from:

http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009/cpi_2009_table

[Accessed 5 May 2010].

UNDP, 2009. *Human Development Report 2009 – HDI rankings* [online]. Available from:

<http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/> [Accessed 25 April 2010].

The Freedom House, 2010

The World Bank Glossary, 2004. *Beyond Economic Growth: An Introduction to Sustainable Development* [online]. Available from:

Second Edition <http://www.worldbank.org/depweb/english/beyond/global/glossary.html>

[Accessed 14 May 2010].

The Venice Commission [http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2007/CDL-AD\(2007\)045-e.asp](http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2007/CDL-AD(2007)045-e.asp)

Weber, M., 2003. *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. New York: Dover Publications.

(The World Factbook 2010;

The Embassy of the Kyrgyz Republic in the United Kingdom 2009.

Tran, M., 2010. Kyrgyzstan opposition leader demands president's resignation.

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/apr/08/kyrgyzstan-opposition-demands-bakiyev-resignation>

Toktonaliev, T. and Kim, Y., 2010. Партии Кыргызстана набирают обороты перед выборами. Institute for War and Peace Reporting. <http://iwpr.net/ru/report-news/партии-кыргызстана-набирают-обороты-перед-выборами>

Encyclopedia of the Nations. Kyrgyzstan – History.

<http://www.historyofnations.net/asia/kyrgyzstan.html>